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ARTICLE 177 EEC: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
INTO THE NECESSITY FOR AN EXPANSIVE
INTERPRETATION OF "COURT OR
TRIBUNAL"
I. INTRODUCTION*
The European Court of Justice ("ECJ" or "Court"), established under
the Treaty of Rome,' is composed of thirteen judges and six Advocates
General.2 The Court's crucial and unique, if not paramount, feature is its
jurisdiction granted by Article 177 EEC.3 This jurisdiction renders
* I would like to thank my father, Dr. Zarko Bilbija, for his continued encouragement
and support.
1. On March 25, 1957, six european nations signed the Treaty of Rome and formalized
the European Economic Community ("EEC" or "Community"). The principles originally
promulgated by the European Coal and Steel Community (-ECSC") were preserved, and
a Common Market was created. This date also marked the signing of a third treaty,
European Atomic Energy Community ("EURATOM"). Although the "Merger Treaty" of
1965 unified the three Communities establishing one Council and one Commission
common to all three, the individual functions and powers of the four institutions-Council
of Ministers, Commission, Parliament, and Court of Justice-were delineated separately
in the three founding Treaties. L. NEVILLE BROWN & FRANCIS G. JACOBS, THE COURT
OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES I (L. Neville Brown, 3d ed. 1989); STANLEY
A. BUDD & ALLAN JONES, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A GUIDE TO THE MAzE 23 (3d
ed. 1989).
2. BUDD & JONES, supra note 1, at 43.
3. BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 1, at 169; see EEC TREATY art. 177, infra note 4.
Article 177 reads as follows:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question
is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give
a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or
tribunal of a Member State, against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy
under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court
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preliminary rulings for courts and tribunals of the European Economic
Community ("EEC" or "Community"). 4 Thus, as professor Weiler has
emphasized, "[i]t is common knowledge that Article 177 and the tandem
relationship it establishes between the European Court and Member State
courts has been the most fundamental element in the constitutional
architecture of the European Community legal order." 5 The difficulties in
defining the bodies that may be classified as a "court or tribunal," and thus
have the legal right to avail themselves of the referral power conferred
under Article 177 EEC, is the essence of this note.
Procedurally, the application of Article 177 EEC is akin to an
interlocutory ruling. A member state's national court must first decide
whether a litigant has raised a question of Community law. Second, the
member state's court must then consider whether an ECJ ruling on the
issue is necessary before the national court may render judgment; if so, the
national court may, and in some cases must,6 stay its proceedings and
refer the question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. The ECJ then rules
on the question, and the referring court applies the ECJ's ruling to the case
pending before it.7
Through this procedure, the ECJ, which is the final authority on
Community law, ensures the uniform interpretation and application of
Community law and provides guidance to a national court when it has been
requested to do so. The ECJ's guidance prevents diverging interpreta-
tions of EEC law.9 The lack of uniform interpretation and application of
EEC law "would threaten the very foundations of the Community and its
legal system. It is essential, therefore, that there should be a single court
with ultimate authority to determine these questions of Community
of Justice.
4. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community [EEC Treaty] art. 177, 298
U.N.T.S. 3, 76-77.
5. Joseph H. Weiler, The European Court, National Courts and References for
Preliminary Rulings-The Paradox of Success: A Revisionist View of Article 177 EEC,
in ARTICLE 177 EEC: EXPERIENCES & PROBLEMS 366 (Henry G. Schermers et al. eds.,
1987) [hereinafter EXPERIENCE].
6. When "any such question is raised in a case pending before a court... against
whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall
bring the matter before the Court of Justice." EEC TREATY, supra note 4, at art. 177, para.
3 (emphasis added).
7. 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4656 (1989).
8. K.P.E. LASOK, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 46
(1984).
9. See BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 1, at 173.
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law-that authority is conferred on the European Court of Justice by Art.
177."1°
The ECJ places emphasis on the unlimited right of all courts and
tribunals to refer a question of interpretation of Community law to the
ECJ whenever they consider that a preliminary ruling is necessary to enable
them to give judgment. This raises a crucial threshold issue: Which
adjudicatory authorities qualify as a "court or tribunal" for the purpose of
Article 177?"
Two polar views, one restrictive, the other expansive, have been
offered concerning that question. The restrictive interpretation, proposed
primarily by the United Kingdom, is that only appellate courts should be
authorized to refer questions of interpretation to the ECJ. 2 The expan-
sive view is shared by those who believe that non-judicial bodies should,
when applying Community law, also have the ability to refer preliminary
questions to the Court."
This note reaches two conclusions after it explores the different
motives and divergent goals of the proponents of the opposing views.
First, the uniform application of Community law can be sustained only if
the legal community construes Article 177 EEC as broadly as possible.
That is, all administrative and regulatory bodies, which in effect are the
primary interpreters of Community law, must be allowed to refer questions
to the ECJ. Second, given the variety of judicial structures of member
states, an absolute restriction of referral power to appellate courts or courts
of last instance alone is not viable. Rather, the assessment of whether or
not the referral power through Article 177 EEC is available to a particular
adjudicatory authority must be made on a case-by-case basis.
II. THE CURRENT SCOPE OF ARTICLE 177 EEC
The ECJ has interpreted the clause "court or tribunal" to include non-
judicial bodies to the extent that they resemble judicial courts. 4 The
10. 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14656 (1989).
11. GREG G. MYLES, EEC BRIEF, COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
§ 15 (1986 update).
12. 5 HANS SMrr & PETER HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY-A COMMENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY 456 (Columbia Law School Project
on European Institutions 1988).
13. Henry G. Schermers & J.S. Watson, Report of the Conference, in EXPERIENCES &
PROBLEMS, supra note 5, at 4, 6 (hereinafter Report].
14. See generally Case 109/88, Handels-OG Kontorfunktion Aerernes Forbund I
Danmark (Union of Clerical and Commercial Employees) v. Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening
38319921
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ECJ's guidelines for interpreting "court or tribunal" are derived primarily
through three leading cases 5 : The first, Vaassen, 6 permitted an arbitra-
tion tribunal to submit questions to the ECJ. The second, Broekmeulen, 7
permitted an appeals committee that governed the registration of physicians
to submit questions to the ECJ. The third, Nordsee," refused to permit
an arbitrator to submit questions to the ECJ. The guidelines set forth by
Vaassen, Broekmeulen, and Nordsee, which are still applicable today, are
well summarized by the Court in Handels:
The definition of court or tribunal under Community law
presupposes an independent body which is called upon to hear
and determine disputes. The court or tribunal must be set up on
a statutory basis as a permanent institution. Its jurisdiction must
be mandatory and it must be called upon to apply rules of law in
order to give decisions in contentious proceedings. 9
The Court's four criteria effectively encapsulate "court or tribunal" to
approximate, as closely as possible, a traditional judicial court.
Despite the final result in Nordsee, the ECJ did not categorically
exclude arbitrators as a class from the bodies entitled to refer questions to
the ECJ through Article 177 EEC." Instead, the jurisdiction of the ECJ
depends on the nature of the arbitration in question. The factors consid-
ered in Nordsee were whether the parties voluntarily submitted to
arbitration, whether the national law conferred an obligation on private
individuals to submit to arbitration under the particular circumstances, and
whether the national courts are able to examine questions of Community
law raised in arbitration, for example, through collaboration, review, and
(Danish Employers' Association) ex parte Danfoss A/S, 1 C.M.L.R. 8 (1989).
15. See A. E. Kellerman & J. S. Watson, Documentation on the Preliminary Procedure
[hereinafter Documentation], in EXPERMNCES AND PROBLEMS, supra note 5, at 403, 410-
11.
16. Case 61/65, G. Vaassen (nre Grbbels) v. Bestuur van hat Beambtenfonds voor het
Mijnbedrijf, 1966 E.C.R. 261, 1966 C.M.L.R. 508.
17. Case 246/80, C. Broekmeulen v. Huisarts Registratie Commissie, 1981 E.C.R. 2311,
1 C.M.L.R. 91 (1982).
18. Case 102/8 1, Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v. Reederei Mond
Hochseefischerei Nordstem AG & Co. KG, 1982 E.C.R. 1095.
19. Case 109/88, Handels-OG Kontorfunktion Aerernes Forbund I Danmark (Union of
Clerical and Commercial Employees) v. Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening (Danish Employers'
Association) ex parte Danfoss A/S, 1 C.M.L.R. 8 (1989).
20. Report, supra note 13, at 6.
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enforcement. Simply stated, the national court or tribunal must, in the
course of its auxiliary or supervisory functions, decide the extent to which
it is necessary to refer to the ECJ the question raised.2
Many arguments have been advanced to advocate including arbitrators
in the subset of referring bodies.' Litigants in Community law are
moving toward arbitration for final determination of disputes; courts are
attempting to limit the possibilities of appeal from arbitration.23 Thus,
efficiency would dictate inclusion.
In addition to arbitral tribunals, "national bodies responsible for
interpreting Community law[,] even though they cannot be regarded as
judicial authorities under national law," should be included among those
bodies which may avail themselves of Article 177 EEC.2 Furthermore,
some of these non-judicial bodies "definitively settle a case where a
question of Community law is involved."' Taking it even one step further,
"certain important laws and regulations, especially in economic matters, are
enforced with the help of advisory bodies, which are without judicial
powers but whose opinions will have a decisive impact on administrative
decisions and/or future procedures or developments in procedure."
26
Thus, two goals are cited as underlying the policy decisions of the
ECJ. The first, being to develop the law and the second to interpret and
apply community law uniformly. Depending on which one is accepted, the
demarkation of extension of Article 177 EEC could stop at various points.
If the goal is to develop the law,27 the referral power should arguably be
21. See Case 102/81, Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v. Reederei Mond
Hochseefischerei Nordstem AG & Co. KG, 1982 E.C.R. 1095.
22. See Clive M. Schmitthoff, Arbitration and EEC Law, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
143 (1987); Gerhard Bebr, Arbitration Tribunals and Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, 22
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 489 (1985).
23. Report, supra note 13, at 6.
24. Adrey Bos, Notes on the Role of the State in the Procedure Pursuant to Article 177
of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, in EXPERIENCES AND
PROBLEMS, supra note 5, at 272, 275.
25. A. Deringer, Some Comments by a German Advocate on Problems Concerning the
Application of Article 177 EEC, in EXPERIENCES AND PROBLEMS, supra note 5, at 210,
212.
26. A. Desmazieres de Sechelles, Experiences and Problems in Applying the
Preliminary Proceedings of Article 177 of the EEC Treaty of Rome, as seen by a French
Advocate, in EXPERI NCES AND PROBLEMS, supra note 5, at 148, 152.
27. See Generally BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 1, at 178-79; R. Vob, Experiences and
Problems in Applying Article 177 of the EEC Treaty-From the Point of View of a German
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restricted to judicial bodies that make law. However, if the goal is to
interpret and apply Community law uniformly-which is, in fact, the
case-then all bodies that interpret or apply Community law should be
allowed to refer questions to the ECJ. This later category extends from
hearing panels to administrative bodies.
I. RESTRICTING "COURT OR TRIBUNAL" TO APPELLATE
COURTS OR COURTS OF LAST INSTANCE
There does not seem to be any way to reconcile the opposing views
about the most effective stage of given proceedings at which to refer a
question, using Article 177 EEC, to the ECJ.29 Under case law, referrals
should be within the sole discretion of the national court.3° The point in
dispute, however, is whether referral power should be reserved exclusively
to courts of intermediate appellate jurisdiction or courts of last instance.
The position taken by the United Kingdom is that, indeed, the power of
referral ought to be so limited.3' Most notable is Lord Denning's opinion
and guidelines regarding the use of Article 177 EEC in Bulmer v.
Bollinger.
32
Judge, in ExPERiENCES AND PROBLEMS, supra note 5, at 55, 67.
28. C.W.A. Timmermans, Concluding Remarks, in EXPERiENCES & PROBLEMS, supra
note 5, at 47, 50; M. Seidel, Experiences of the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany with Article 177 References, in EXPERIENCES & PROBLEMS, supra note 5, at 239.
29. Report, supra note 13 , at 4.
30. Joined cases 36 & 71/80, Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association and Others v.
Government of Ireland and Others; Martin Doyle and Others v. An Taoiseach and Others,
1981 E.C.R. 735, 2 C.M.L.R. 455 (1981).
31. 5 SMrr & HERZOG, supra note 12, at 456.
32. The guidelines are as follows:
First, on whether a decision is necessary:
(1) The point must be conclusive. The test set forth is akin to the 'outcome
determinative' test in the United States. The judgment depends directly upon the
interpretation of the point of law submitted for interpretation.
(2) No previous ruling on point. If the same or substantially the same point has
already been decided by the European Court, it is not necessary to refer it unless the
English court believes the previous decision is wrong or unless "there are new factors
which 'ought to be brought to the notice of the European Court.'"
(3) Acte Claire doctrine. If the point is "reasonably clear and free from doubt," all
that remains is applying the EEC legal proposition at issue, and that is the job of the
English court. There is no need for interpretation; therefore, a reference is not necessary.
(4) All the facts must be ascertained first.
Second, on whether the court should exercise its discretion if the condition of necessity is
fulfilled:
ARTICLE 177 EEC
A. In Favor of Limitation to Courts of Appeal
In general, advocates of limited-referral rely on three suppositions in
support of their view. First, relevant facts are not substantiated until the
appellate stage has been reached. Second, the need for a preliminary ruling
will crystallize only after the case has been subject to the judicial process
in a court of first instance. Third, judges presiding over higher courts are
better able to understand and formulate the question at issue.33
1. Facts
It is undisputed that the facts pertaining to a case are to be established
by the national court' while the competence of the ECJ is limited to the
question of Community law referred to it.35 The ECJ confirmed this
division of labor in Oehlschager, in which it explicitly ruled that verifying
facts submitted by a national court is not within the competence of the ECJ
under Article 177 EEC.3' Furthermore, for a national court to conclude
that a referral is necessary to enable it to pass judgment, the facts must be
ascertained first."
Alternatively, the ECJ is supposed to "operate in a sort of factless
vacuum"38 during Article 177 EEC proceedings. History, however, has
(1) Time to get a ruling. When expediency is more important, such as in a case
seeking an injunction, the court should interpret on its own.
(2) Keep the workload of the European Court to a minimum.
(3) Formulate the question clearly. The English court should find the facts, state
them clearly, and formulate the question as one confined to interpretation.
(4) Unless the point is difficult and important, it would be preferable for the English
judge to decide it rather than to refer.
(5) Expense to the parties of getting a ruling from the European Court.
(6) Defer in part to the wishes of the parties. If both parties wish to defer, the
English court should consider this but should not give it excessive weight. If one party
expressly does not want to refer, the English court should "hesitate" due to the expense and
delay involved in making a reference. H P Bulmer Ltd. and Shhoerings Ltd. v. Bollinger
SA and Champagne Lanson Pere et Fils, 1974 Ch. 401, 3 W.L.R. 202 (1974), 2 All E.R.
1226 (1974).
33. Report, supra note 13, at 4-5.
34. T. Koopmans, The Technique of the Preliminary Question-A View From the Court
of Justice, in EXPERIENCEs & PROBLEMS, supra note 5, at 327, 329.
35. LAsOK, supra note 8, at 46.
36. Case 104/77, Firma Wolfgang Oehlschlager v. Hauptzollamt Emmerich, 1978
E.C.R. 791.
37. Vob, supra note 27, at 60.
38. D.A.O. Edward, The Problem of Fact-Finding in Preliminary Proceedings Under
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indicated that the ECJ is often compelled to consider facts.39 Most
questions of law referred to the ECJ are virtually meaningless without the
applicable factual background.40 As a result, the ECJ itself "does
investigate facts because, for practical reasons, it must do so if it is to do
its job efficiently and avoid unnecessary delay."4' Thus, a mechanism
requiring cases to go through a full initial proceeding in a court of first
instance, in which all relevant facts are ascertained, would heighten the
efficiency of the ECJ.
2. Necessity of Referral
In R v. Plymouth Justices, ex parte Rogers, Lord Chief Justice Lane
elucidated the superior ability of higher courts to analyze the facts
presented to them and to decide on the necessity of the referral:
[lI]n the ordinary way justices should exercise considerable
caution before referring even after they have heard all the
evidence. If they come to a wrong decision on Community law,
a higher court can make the reference and frequently the higher
court would be the more suitable forum to do so. The higher
court is as a rule in a better position to assess whether any
reference is desirable.42
Lord Lane implies that lower-court judges are not sufficiently familiar with
Community law,43 are inexperienced in procedural matters,"4 and are
unable to understand the "full socio-economic" history of the issues.
4
Article 177 EEC, in EXPERIENCES & PROBLEMS, supra note 11, at 216, 217.
39. Id. at 218.
40. See id at 217-18.
41. Id at 217.
42. R. v. Plymouth Justices, ex parte Rogers, 1982 Q.B. 863 (Eng. C.A.), 3 W.L.R. 1
(1982), 2 All E.R. 175 (1982).
43. Vob, supra note 27, at 66.
44. F. Herbert, Article 177 EEC: The Experiences of the Parties in Belgium, in
EXPERIENCES & PROBLEMS, supra note 5, at 195, 198; A. Saggio, Italian Experience in
the Application of Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, in EXPERIENCES & PROBLEMS, supra
note 5, at 109; Aristidis Calogeropoulos, The Greek Courts and the Preliminary Reference
Procedure According to Article 177 of the EEC Treaty: Some Remarks, in EXPERIENCES
& PROBLEMS, supra note 5, at 122, 124.




These so-called "shortfalls of lower courts" have been adamantly disput-
ed.46
Notwithstanding the widespread acceptance of the basic premises
enumerated above, it cannot be denied that their applicability varies from
one member state to the next.4' Suggestions of global reform are
criticized for erroneously presupposing that problems of application and
procedure of Article 177 EEC are "uniform across the board."4 Profes-
sor Weiler, for example, emphasizes that instead of a "homogeneous legal
order," the reality is that "the geometry of 'Judicial Europe' is distinctly
variable."49 The differences are self-evident, both among the member
states and within"' them. The obvious solution to this judicial imbalance,
which by its nature hinders the uniform legal growth of the Community,
is to encourage more referrals from newer member states and from the less
experienced courts.5 2 Moreover, given the ongoing integration of the
Common Market, it would be most productive to educate all parties
concerned, including, undoubtedly, judges of courts of first instance. 3
3. Better Formulation of Question
Framing the question for referral is often considered to be more
difficult than obtaining the answer.' One reason why this is so is
46. See generally Report, supra note 13, at 5; Gerhard Bebr, The Preliminary
Proceedings of Article 177 EEC-Problems and Suggestions for Improvement, in
EXPOENCES & PROBLEMS, supra note 5, at 345, 354; Deringer supra note 25, at 212.
47. See generally Introduction, in EXPERIENCES & PROBLEMS, supra note 5, at XXXI-
XXXH; Report, supra note 13, at 4.
48. Weiler, supra note 5, at 371.
49. Id
50. Id "Differences are clear among the Member States: one cannot compare-or
rather one can compare, but not equate-the situation as regards Article 177 as between,
say, the Netherlands on the one hand and Greece, or, for that matter Portugal on the other."
51. Id. "Differences are also clear within or across Member State lines: one cannot
equate the situation of some of the fiscal and commercial courts-the 'repeat players' of
the system-called upon to apply Community law as a matter of growing routine, and the
'one-shot players' such as, say, a local magistrate faced once, in a career otherwise
consisting of fining drunkards and dealing with petty crime, with an issue of Community
law."
52. ld. Weiler suggests on in this essay that as regards the more experienced courts,
revision may, in fact, be justifiable. See id
53. See GREG MYLES, 1 EEC BRIEF, COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIS § 18 (1986 update).
54. See generally Report, supra note 13, at 12-16.
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because the role of the ECJ is strictly one of interpretation, there is an
inherent element of abstraction in the entire process of using Article 177
EEC."5 The national judge must formulate the question in such a fashion
that the governing principle is comprehendible to the ECJ. The ECJ, in
turn, will supply an answer in the format of an abstract legal principle. 6
Essentially, the national judge must travel the analytical spectrum from
specifics to abstraction, and then back again, from abstraction to specif-
ics.1
7
This premise, the alleged inadequacy of lower court judges, implies
that more experienced judges, presumably sitting on higher courts, will be
more adept at this process. Lord Lane, in discussing the appropriateness
of lower courts to make references, wrote that "[o]n references the form of
the question is of importance and the higher court will normally be in a
better position to assess the appropriateness of the question and to assist
in formulating it clearly."' This assertion loses some credibility when
coupled with the parties' active participation in drafting questions in
English courts. 9 In fact, the very nature and form of the questions often
become a disputed issue between the two parties.60 Thus, the task of
formulation does not fall solely into the laps of judges. Consequently,
deficiencies, if any, in the bench are rectified through the involvement of
attorneys who are often more familiar than some of the judges with
Community law.6
Although the higher courts of many Member States submit sophisticat-
ed questions,62 the degree to which the end result contributes to the
55. See Vob, supra note 27, at 66-67.
56. See id. at 66.
57. See id
58. R. v. Plymouth Justices, ex parte Rogers, 1982 Q.B. 863 (Eng. C.A.), 3 W.L.R. 1
(1982), 2 All E.R. 175 (1982).
59. Report, supra note 13, at 12.
60. A. Lester, QC, The Uncertain Trumpet References to the Court of Justice from the
United Kingdom: Equal Pay and Equal Treatment Without Sex Discrimination, in
EXPERIENCES & PROBLEMS, supra note 5, at 164, 192.
61. Report, supra note 13, at 13.
62. Corte di Cassazione is praised for the high technical quality of the submits
preliminary references. Specifically, among the most important are the order of 21 May
1981 in SlOT v. Ministero delle Fmanze (Case 266181, Judgment of 16 March 1983, 9183
E.C.R. 731), the three orders dated 25 March 1981 in Ministero delle Fimanze v. Societa
Petrolifera Italia and Ministero delle F'manze v. Societa Michelin Italiana (Joined Cases
267-269/8 1, Judgment of 16 March 1983, 1983 E.C.R. 801), and the order of 27 May 1981
in CILFIT and others v. Ministero della Sanita (Case 283/81, Judgment of 6 October 1982,
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overall development of Community law 3 is disputable. Are the questions
more advanced, resulting in an efficient use of the system? On the other
hand, are the questions too technical and narrowly tailored to the case at
bar, thereby not contributing to Community law?
Opinions conflict regarding the proper goal to be pursued when
drafting a question for referral. There is support for seeking both a
statement of principle and for seeking a concrete ruling." Because the
answer provided by the ECJ is only binding on the referring court and the
case at bar,' obtaining a concrete ruling may be the preferable goal. The
ultimate purpose of Article 177 EEC is, however, to ensure uniform
interpretation and application of Community law." To this end, an
answer confined to a more general statement of principle, applicable to
similar cases and issues not only within the referring member state but also
across its borders, is better. The latter route would ensure procedural
economy, promote legal certainty, and facilitate the predictability of
judicial decisions.67
B. Against the Limitation to Courts of Appeal
As a general proposition, limiting the referral power to courts of
appeal has been adamantly opposed by participants and commentators
within the EEC legal system." Both practical and theoretical arguments
support permitting courts of first instance to avail themselves of Article
177 and to refer questions of interpretation to the ECJ.
The practical arguments revolve around expediency and cost-efficien-
cy. The theoretical arguments center around concepts of principle and
judicial fairness and economy. These arguments, jointly and severally,
outweigh the converse arguments in support of the limitation outlined
above.
1982 E.C.R. 3415).
63. Most commentators and participants, except the British, share the overall objective
of development of Community law. In fact, Sir Anthony Lincoln of the High Court of
Justice in London takes the view that, in maling a preliminary reference, a court should
be concerned only with the case pending before it and with making law. Report, supra
note 13, at 14.
64. Report, supra note 13, at 13.
65. BRoWN & JAcOBS, supra note 1, at 319.
66. LASOK, supra note 8.
67. Report, supra note 13, at 13-14.
68. See generally Report, supra note 13, at 4-6; Bebr, supra note 46, at 354.
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1. Practical Arguments
Expediency" and cost-efficiency ° dominate the practical arguments.
Central to these arguments is that if a referral is necessary, it should be
made as soon possible. Moreover, the parties should not be forced to
appeal to a higher domestic court solely for the purpose of obtaining the
referral essential to the outcome of the case." On occasion, this principle
is applicable even before the lower courts fully determine the relevant
facts. The ECJ set forth this principle in Irish Creamery:' "[W]here the
national court cannot, without a ruling of this Court, be sure what the
relevant issues of fact, if any, are,' 3 then referrals before the facts are
determined may be justified. At this extreme lies a rather narrow subset
of cases. In sum, the referral should be made as soon as the potential
referring body ascertains sufficiently what appear to be the pertinent
facts.74
2. Theoretical Arguments
In addition to expediency and cost-efficiency, concepts of principle,
judicial fairness, and judicial economy support the need to read Article 177
expansively. Limiting the right of lower courts to refer questions to the
ECJ is wrong as a matter of principle. In addition, judicial fairness and
economy is undermined by preventing the trial courts from interacting
directly with the ECJ. The theoretical arguments in favor of a direct
relationship between the lower courts and the ECJ outweigh the arguments
for limitation.
a. As a Matter of Principle
To restrict the right of lower courts to interact with the ECJ would
alter the "scope of the preliminary ruling procedure."" Furthermore, it
69. A. Deringer, supra note 25.
70. Report, supra note 13, at 9.
71. Report, supra note 13, at 4.
72. Joined cases 36 & 71/80, Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association and Others v.
Government of Ireland and Others; Martin Doyle and Others v. An Taoiseach and Others,
1981 E.C.R. 735, 2 C.M.L.R. 455 (1981).
73. Joined cases 36 & 71/80, Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association and Others v.
Government of Ireland and Others; Martin Doyle and Others v. An Taoiseach and Others,
1981 E.C.R. 735, 2 C.M.L.R. 455 (1981).
74. R.A.A. Duk, Some Remarks of a Dutch Advocate on the Preliminary Procedure of
Article 177 EEC, in EXPERIENCM & PROBLEMS, supra note 5, at 204, 205.
75. Vob, supra note 27, at 67.
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would be wrong as a matter of principle76 and would also result in
restricting the jurisdiction of the ECJ." The weight of this argument is
further reflected in the development of Community law. Two prime
examples are the repeal of a Greek statute78 at the explicit request of the
Commission and the well known Rheinmuhlen" case.
The first request for a preliminary ruling from the highest Greek court,
the plenary session of the Greek Council of State, arose from a case
brought initially before the fourth chamber of the Council of State, a lower
court. The chamber applied Greek Law No. 1470/1984, Article 1(5),
which provided that "[t]he reference of a case to the plenary session [of the
Council of State] is... mandatory when the chamber considers that the
Court of Justice of the European Communities should be asked for a
preliminary ruling." '° Accordingly, the case was referred to the plenary
session, which in turn requested a preliminary ruling from the ECJ.g' The
EEC Commission found that the obligation to refer a case to a higher court
instead of requesting a preliminary ruling directly from the ECJ is
inconsistent with the requirements of Article 177 EEC. Accordingly, the
Commission requested that the law be repealed. As a direct result of the
request, the Greek law requiring lower courts to refer cases involving EEC
law to the plenary session was repealed. 2
In Rheinmuhlen, the ECJ addressed the question "whether, under
Article 177, a lower Court has a completely unfettered right to refer
questions to this [ECJ] Court or whether that Article leaves unaffected
rules of national law to the contrary."8 3  Advocate General Warner
decided on the former: Article 177 EEC confers on lower courts or
tribunals of Member States a completely unfettered right to referral. In
rejecting a portion of Advocate General Romer's opinion in Chanel,"
76. Report, supra note 13, at 5.
77. Id
78. The Attitude of National Supreme Courts to Community Law [hereinafter Attitude],
European Information Service, Jan., 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, EURINT
File.
79. Case 166/73, Rheinmuhlen-Dusseldorf v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide,
1974 E.C.R. 33, 1 C.M.L.R. 523 (1974).
80. Attitude, supra note 78 (quoting Greek Law No. 1470/1984, Article 1(5)).
81. Id
82. Id
83. Case 166/73, Rheinmuhlen-Dusseldorf v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide,
1974 E.C.R. 33, 1 C.M.L.R. 523, at 524-25 (1974).
84. The ECJ deferred delivering judgment pending the outcome of a national appeal
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Advocate General Warner pointed to an extension of Advocate General
Romer's reasoning that would give "to a national appellate Court the last
word on the question whether a particular case gives rise to a question of
Community law. That must mean in certain circumstances... giving to
that Court rather than to this Court the last word as to the scope of
Community law."" Advocate General Warner further stated that any
qualification by the national laws of member states on the "unqualified
terms of Article 177" would be objectionable to the ECJ. 6 As professor
Mitchell stated succinctly, "Rheinmuhlen not Bulmer must rule."
s7
In light of these examples, a limitation on the lower national courts'
accessibility to Article 177 EEC is contrary to the principles of Community
law.
b. Judicial Fairness and Judicial Economy
Additional arguments in support of referrals by courts of first instance
rest on promoting judicial economy. Clarifying the issues of Community
law pertinent to each case occurs during the initial stages of a legal
proceeding, when the referral is made by the court of first instance." In
addition, the higher courts, often lacking enthusiasm in initiating referrals
to the ECJ, are already bound by any preliminary ruling previously
requested by a lower court.89 It follows that allowing lower courts to
make referrals ensures that all necessary questions of interpretation will in
fact reach the ECJ.
If one assumes that national courts will adhere strictly to Article 177
EEC,' a truly necessary question will be referred, at the latest, by the
highest national court. This view, however, is often unrealistic.9
Initially, supreme national courts were reluctant to defer questions of
interpretation to an outside court whose decisions would be binding on
against the reference. Case 31/68, Chanel v Cepeha, 1970 E.C.R. 403.
85. Case 166/73, Rheinmuhlen-Dusseldorf v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide,
1974 E.C.R. 33, 1 C.M.L.R. 523, at 528-29 (1974).
86. Id.
87. GREG MYLES, 1 EEC BRIF, COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
§18 (1986 update)(quoting J.D.B. Mitchell, Sed Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?, 11
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 355 (1974)).
88. Bebr, supra note 46, at 354.
89. Id.
90. EEC TREATY, supra note 4, at art. 177, para. 3.
91. See generally Attitude, supra note 78.
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them.' Although most of this direct resistance has dissipated, more
subtle forms of resistance, such as abuse of the acte clair doctrine, have
emerged and persisted."
The capability of lower courts to use Article 177 EEC efficiently is
often questioned." It is argued, however, that not only are the lower
courts "perfectly capable" of effectively utilizing Article 177 but,
furthermore, that many decisions resulting from these referrals have
significantly contributed to the development of Community law." One
possible reason for this is the seemingly general tendency for lower courts
to make referrals on fundamental, rather than technical, issues of Commu-
nity law.' The decisive role of the lower courts has also been looked
upon favorably because "in the legal architecture of the Community all
national courts, when confronted with Community issues become, willy
nilly, Community courts. Community law has correctly been perceived as
'belonging' exclusively neither to specialized courts nor to appeal or
constitutional courts."
97
To summarize, preserving the intentions behind Article 177 EEC, both
as a matter of principle as well as a matter of practicality, require that any
hierarchical limitation on the use of the referral procedure be rejected."
C. No Hierarchical Limitation on the use of
Article 177 EEC is Possible
A conclusion shared by many who have grappled with the questions
posited here is that no absolute rule limiting referral power, through Article
177 EEC, is viable. Some authorities suggest that the ultimate factor
should concern the sector involved as opposed to the particular level of the
judicial hierarchy." Abusing the broad discretion granted to national
courts permeates all levels of the courts. Lower courts that do not wish to
follow the case law of a higher court may refer a question to the ECJ in
hopes that an interpretation by the ECJ will add credibility to their
92. Attitude, supra note 78, at 108.
93. Id
94. See generally Report, supra note 13, at 4-6.
95. Report, supra note 13, at 5.
96. Bebr, supra note 46, at 354.
97. Weiler, supra note 5, at 367.
98. See generally id
99. Duk, supra note 74, at 205; Report, supra note 13, at 5 (excerpt from comments
made by Herbert during the conference).
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decision.'00 To avoid this roundabout fashion of usurping the authority
by lower courts, higher courts also make referrals which are not, strictly
speaking, necessary.10'
It is also posited that "the timing [of referrals] is never right." 10
Moreover, perhaps most importantly, the diverse cultures, the judicial
structures, and the legal developments in the Community's twelve member
states impede absolute, general, restrictions of this nature.' 03
D. Conflicting Goals and Motivation
of Opposing Proponents
The stated goals of the two proposals for the best use of Article 177
EEC are as diametrically opposed as the proposals themselves. Shifting
the referral procedure to appellate courts would presumably reduce the case
load before the ECJ. Consequently, the Court could then target its
resources to primary and fundamental issues of Community law.'"
4
There is no debate on the two-fold advantages to be gained from easing the
workload of the Court. The first is that time delays will be reduced. The
second is that the ECJ will gain a heightened credibility; the normative
effect will increase, the "specific gravity" of each judgment will be
heightened, and the ECJ will be better able to continue to conform to the
high judicial standard it has established." The debate here is not over
the desired end; instead, it is over whether the ends justify the means.
Those opposed to the limitation on referral power stress the preserva-
tion of the purpose of Article 177 EEC and offer alternative solutions to
ease the workload of the ECJ. Some proposals include giving a power of
certiorari to the ECJ,"'° allowing lower courts to take some of the
100. Vob, supra note 27, at 67-68.
101. Id at 69.
102. I. Verougstraete, Article 177 EEC: A View From the Belgian Judiciary, in
EXPERIENCES & PROBLEMS, supra note 5, at 128, 130.
103. Report, supra note 13, at 4 (excerpt from Weiler's statements made during the
conference).
104. Bebr, supra note 46.
105. BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 1, at 326; Weiler, supra note 5, at 368-69.
106. Rasmussen strongly urges this option as one viable for implementation in the
European setting, after that establishing it is the most important form of docket-control
available to the U.S. Supreme Court. Hjalte Rasmussen, Issues of Admissibility and
Justiciability in EC Judicial Adjudication of Federalism Disputes Under Article 177 EEC,
in EXPERIENCES & PROBLEMS, supra note 5, at 379, 381.
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cases, 107and referring lower courts to other cases that have interpreted
similar issues.'0 Alternatively, "practical difficulties cannot stand in the
way of a proper application of Community law."'09
The text of several opinions, however, indicate that the underlying
motive behind limiting referrals to higher courts may be altogether different
from the stated goal. Issues of judicial sovereignty and, when applicable,
precedent come forward.
1. Judicial Sovereignty
A perceived threat of impinging on the ultimate authority of higher
courts is evident." 0 In Rheinmuhien, the plaintiff's argument implied
that the Hessisches Finanzgericht, the referring court, which, bound by
national law to accept the views of the Bundesfinazhof, was "seek[ing] to
escape from them by invoking the jurisdiction of this [ECJ] Court.""'
The Bundesfinazhof's order for referral reflects this concern. In rejecting
the implication, the Court first acknowledged that lower courts should
"respect and be loyal to the decisions of Courts that are superior to it."" 2
Notwithstanding this general principle, the lower court was "not seeking
to directly substitute its own view for that of the superior national
Court."" 3 Rather, the lower court was seeking to clarify an issue of
Community law from the only court competent to rule definitively on it-
the ECJ.
In Bulmer, Lord Denning argued for discretion to all English courts,
save the House of Lords, in deciding whether or not a referral through
107. Article 168A already accomplishes this by creating a court of first instance whose
decisions are subject to a right of appeal to the ECJ on points of law. This court, however,
"shall not be competent to hear and determine... questions referred for a preliminary
ruling under Article 177." EEC TREATY, supra note 4, at art. 168A. Thus, although the
court of first instance will ease the workload of the ECJ, this will not affect the number
of questions submitted to the ECJ through Article 177 EEC-which only the ECJ is
competent to adjudicate. See id,
108. See M.R. Mok, Experiences of the Netherlands Courts in Applying the Preliminary
Proceedings ofArticle 177 EEC, in EXPERIENCES & PROBLEMS, supra note 5, at 114, 117.
109. A.G. Toth, Observations on Certain Problems Involved in the Application of
Article 177 EEC, in EXPERIENCES AND PROBLEMS, supra note 5, at 394, 398.
110. See Attitude, supra note 78.
111. Case 166/73, Rheinmuhlen-Dusseldorf v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide,
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Article 177 EEC is necessary. Nevertheless, by setting stringent guide-
lines" 4 for the lower courts, Lord Denning effectively gave all the power
to the House of Lords. The strong language he used implies resentment
of the ultimate authority of the ECJ, which "even the House of Lords has
to bow down to.""'3 The trial judge "has complete discretion," according
to Lord Denning, and has no obligation to refer "unless he wishes."
116
The appellate judges also have full discretion and "can interpret the treaty
themselves if they think fit." 7  Although Lord Denning accepted that
discretion stops at the House of Lords, the reason he gave is not that the
House of Lords must abide by Article 177 EEC."" Instead, he focused
on the importance of cases that reach the House and opined that "if a point
of interpretation arises there, it is assumed to be worthy of reference to the
European Court... [whereas] points in the lower courts may not be worth
troubling [the ECJ. " ' 9 The perceived inferiority of the lower courts is
obvious.
Furthermore, throughout much of the opinion, Lord Denning applied
"the plain-meaning rule" to Article 177 EEC, interpreting all words subject
to interpretation as narrowly and literally as possible. 20 Thus, he made
it virtually impossible for a lower court to refer. Then, however, Lord
Denning abandoned the "plain meaning rule" and laid down a rule for the
English courts to follow when faced with the problem of interpreting EEC
law (i.e., treatises, regulations, and directives): "No longer must they
examine the words in meticulous detail... [or] argue about the precise
grammatical sense. [The lower English courts] must look to the purpose
or intent [of the document's language]." 12  Consequently, if all these
guidelines are combined, the narrow construction of Article 177 EEC
114. H P Bulmer Ltd. and Shhoerings Ltd. v. Bollinger SA and Champagne Lanson
Pere et Fils, 1974 Ch. 401, 3 W.L.R. 202 (1974), 2 All E.R. 1226 (1974).
115. l at 6 (emphasis added).
116. Id. In fact, Lord Denning lists several reasons a judge may give for not referring:
"It will be too costly."; "It will take too long to get an answer."; and "I am well able to
decide it myself." Id
117. d at 7.
118. EEC TREATY, supra note 4, at art. 177 (mandatory referral in courts from which
no national judicial remedy is available).
119. H P Bulmer Ltd. and Shhoerings Ltd. v. Bollinger SA and Champagne Lanson
Pere et Fils, 1974 Ch. 401, 3 W.L.R. 202 (1974), 2 All E.R. 1226 (1974).
120. Id
121. Id at 12. Note, however, that Lord Denning, in interpreting Article 177 EEC did
exactly the opposite. Does the rule not apply to him or does it not apply to Article 177
EEC?
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encourages lower courts to interpret Community law on their own; the
expansive guidelines for such interpretation require them to do so "within
the spirit of the treaty and... if they find a gap, they must fill it as best
they can."" 2 This encourages the judicial autonomy of the English
national judiciary in general and the House of Lords in particular.
2. Precedent
The ECJ is not bound by prior decisions. Thus, the concept of
precedent is non-existent in this setting.2 3 Although the Court prefers
to follow its own decisions, it does depart from them. The principle of
precedent, however, does exist the in English common law. The effect on
English cases involving EEC law has been an attempt by the courts to
reconcile this paradox. In a recent case," after enunciating the basic
distinction between following common law precedent in intra-English cases
and deciding to do so when considering EEC law, the Enderby court held
that, as a matter of course, lower courts should allow "litigants to exhaust
the appeal procedures within this [United Kingdom's] jurisdiction and to
allow the highest appellate court, the House of Lords, to decide whether
the matter is properly to be referred to the ECJ."' An exception to this
general proposition is to be made in England only in limited circumstanc-
es.2 6 Finally, particular importance must be given to cases in which the
House of Lords has already decided that English law and that of the EEC
are the same on a given issue.'" Ergo, the existence of precedent,
giving deference to higher courts, is a strong motivating factor to "strip"
referral power from the lower courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
The language of Article 177 EEC sets out to promote cooperation
between the ECJ and the member states' national courts and tribunals in
order to establish uniformity of interpretation of EEC law. In fact,
122. 1d
123. BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 1, at 314.
124. Enderby v. Frenchay Health Authority, 1 C.M.L.R. 626 (1991)(Emp. App.Trib.,
21 Dec. 1990).
125. Id
126. The rule applies when the issue is manifestly clear-cut and will decide the case,
when there is no guidance from higher courts, and when the parties consent. Id
127. Id.
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paragraph three of Article 177 EEC mandates that every member state's
court of last instance refer necessary questions of interpretation of EEC law
to the ECJ. This effectively guarantees that all such questions eventually
reach the ECJ, and therefore assures continued cooperation between the
national and Community judicial bodies as well as uniformity of interpreta-
tion of EEC law.
The EEC's effort to promote judicial cooperation and uniformity of
legal interpretation is further evidenced by ECJ decisions that encourage
Article 177 EEC referrals even when the facts have not been fully
ascertained," s that reformulate questions on finding the need to do
so,1 29 and that adopt a broad reading of "necessary" by giving full
discretion to national courts.130 These cases demonstrate that the ECJ
does not support the practical arguments set forth in favor of limiting
referral power to appellate courts or courts of last instance.
Furthermore, as a matter of principle, no restriction should be made
because doing so would impinge on the national judicial sovereignty of the
member states. One must also question the true motivation of those judges
and commentators who advocate purging the lower courts of the ability to
interact directly with the ECJ. Their alleged aim of instituting indirectly
a form of docket control for reasons of time, efficiency, or national judicial
sovereignty are irrelevant. Irrespective of the reasons proffered, it is not
within the scope of their role in the EEC to make these decisions.
Furthermore, if the Court is to take this proposition seriously and
contemplate depleting its own jurisdictional scope, it must be convinced
that doing so would be in the best interest of the Community, not just that
of the superior national courts.' 3' The evidence, however, simply does
not support this inference.
Nevena Amy Bilbija
128. Joined cases 36 & 71/80, Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Ass'n v. Government of
Ireland; Martin Doyle v. An Taoiseach, 1981 E.C.R. 735, 2 C.M.L.R. 455 (1981).
129. Report, supra note 13, at 16.
130. See Case 283/81, Societe CILFIT et Lanificio di Gavardo v. Ministry of Health,
1982 E.C.R. 3415, 1 C.M.L.R. 472 (1983).
131. See Rasmussen, supra note 106, at 386.
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